Difference between revisions of "NTLM Authentication"

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<html>
=References=


<H1>NTLM Authentication Scheme for HTTP</H1>
* http://ntlmaps.sourceforge.net/
<H2><A name=intro>Introduction</A></H2>
* http://ntlmaps.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html
<P>This is an attempt at documenting the undocumented NTLM authentication scheme
* http://www.innovation.ch/personal/ronald/ntlm.html
used by M$'s browsers, proxies, and servers (MSIE and IIS); this scheme is also
* [[NTLM Authentication Scheme for HTTP]]
sometimes referred to as the NT challenge/response (NTCR) scheme. Most of the
info here is derived from three sources (see also the <A
href="http://www.innovation.ch/java/ntlm.html#resources">Resources</A> section
at the end of this document): Paul Ashton's work on the <A
href="http://www.argo.demon.co.uk/nt/ntie.html">NTLM security holes</A>, the <A
href="ftp://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba/docs/textdocs/ENCRYPTION.txt">encryption
documentation</A> from <A href="http://samba.anu.edu.au/samba/">Samba</A>, and
network snooping. Since most of this info is reverse-engineered it is bound to
contain errors; however, at least one client and one server have been
implemented according to this data and work successfully in conjunction with
M$'s browsers, proxies and servers.


<P>Note that this scheme is not as secure as <A
href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2617.txt">Digest</A> and some other schemes; it
is slightly better than the Basic authentication scheme, however.
<P>Also note that this scheme is <STRONG>not</STRONG> an http authentication
scheme - it's a connection authentication scheme which happens to (mis-)use http
status codes and headers (and even those incorrectly).
<H2><A name=handshake>NTLM Handshake</A></H2>
<P>When a client needs to authenticate itself to a proxy or server using the
NTLM scheme then the following 4-way handshake takes place (only parts of the
request and status line and the relevant headers are shown here; "C" is the
client, "S" the server): <PRE>    1: C  --&gt; S  GET ...
   
    2: C &lt;--  S  401 Unauthorized
                  WWW-Authenticate: NTLM
   
    3: C  --&gt; S  GET ...
                  Authorization: NTLM &lt;base64-encoded type-1-message&gt;


   
[[Category:Microsoft]][[Category:NTLM]]
    4: C &lt;--  S  401 Unauthorized
                  WWW-Authenticate: NTLM &lt;base64-encoded type-2-message&gt;
   
    5: C  --&gt; S  GET ...
                  Authorization: NTLM &lt;base64-encoded type-3-message&gt;
   
    6: C &lt;--  S  200 Ok
</PRE>
<H2><A name=messages>Messages</A></H2>The three messages sent in the handshake
are binary structures. Each one is described below as a pseudo-C struct and in a
memory layout diagram. <VAR>byte</VAR> is an 8-bit field; <VAR>short</VAR> is a
16-bit field. All fields are unsigned. Numbers are stored in little-endian
order. Struct fields named <VAR>zero</VAR> contain all zeroes. An array length
of "*" indicates a variable length field. Hexadecimal numbers and quoted
characters in the comments of the struct indicate fixed values for the given
field.
 
<P>The field <VAR>flags</VAR> is presumed to contain flags, but their
significance is unknown; the values given are just those found in the packet
traces.
<H3><A name=type1msg>Type-1 Message</A></H3>
<P>This message contains the host name and the NT domain name of the client. <PRE>    struct {
        byte    protocol[8];    // 'N', 'T', 'L', 'M', 'S', 'S', 'P', '\0'
        byte    type;            // 0x01
        byte    zero[3];
        short  flags;          // 0xb203
        byte    zero[2];
 
        short  dom_len;        // domain string length
        short  dom_len;        // domain string length
        short  dom_off;        // domain string offset
        byte    zero[2];
 
        short  host_len;        // host string length
        short  host_len;        // host string length
        short  host_off;        // host string offset (always 0x20)
        byte    zero[2];
 
        byte    host[*];        // host string (ASCII)
        byte    dom[*];          // domain string (ASCII)
    } type-1-message
</PRE><PRE>                0      1      2      3
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        0:  |  'N'  |  'T'  |  'L'  |  'M'  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        4:  |  'S'  |  'S'  |  'P'  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        8:  |  1  |  0  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        12:  | 0x03  | 0xb2  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        16:  | domain length | domain length |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        20:  | domain offset |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        24:  |  host length  |  host length  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        28:  |  host offset  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        32: |  host string                  |
            +                              +
            .                              .
            .                              .
            +            +-----------------+
            |            | domain string  |
            +-------------+                +
            .                              .
            .                              .
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
</PRE>The host and domain strings are ASCII (or possibly ISO-8859-1), are
uppercased, and are not nul-terminated. The host name is only the host name, not
the FQDN (e.g. just "GOOFY", not "GOOFY.DISNEY.COM"). The offset's refer to the
offset of the specific field within the message, and the lengths are the length
of specified field. For example, in the above message <CODE>host_off = 32</CODE>
and <CODE>dom_off = host_off + host_len</CODE>. Note that the lengths are
included twice (for some unfathomable reason).
 
<H3><A name=type2msg>Type-2 Message</A></H3>
<P>This message contains the server's NTLM challenge. <PRE>    struct {
        byte    protocol[8];    // 'N', 'T', 'L', 'M', 'S', 'S', 'P', '\0'
        byte    type;            // 0x02
        byte    zero[7];
        short  msg_len;        // 0x28
        byte    zero[2];
        short  flags;          // 0x8201
        byte    zero[2];
 
        byte    nonce[8];        // nonce
        byte    zero[8];
    } type-2-message
</PRE><PRE>                0      1      2      3
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        0:  |  'N'  |  'T'  |  'L'  |  'M'  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        4:  |  'S'  |  'S'  |  'P'  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        8:  |  2  |  0  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        12:  |  0  |  0  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        16:  |  message len  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        20:  | 0x01  | 0x82  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        24:  |                              |
            +          server nonce        |
        28:  |                              |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        32:  |  0  |  0  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        36:  |  0  |  0  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
</PRE>The nonce is used by the client to create the LanManager and NT responses
(see <A href="http://www.innovation.ch/java/ntlm.html#hashes">Password
Hashes</A>). It is an array of 8 arbitrary bytes. The message length field
contains the length of the complete message, which in this case is always 40.
<H3><A name=type3msg>Type-3 Message</A></H3>
<P>This message contains the username, host name, NT domain name, and the two
"responses". <PRE>    struct {
        byte    protocol[8];    // 'N', 'T', 'L', 'M', 'S', 'S', 'P', '\0'
        byte    type;            // 0x03
        byte    zero[3];
 
        short  lm_resp_len;    // LanManager response length (always 0x18)
        short  lm_resp_len;    // LanManager response length (always 0x18)
        short  lm_resp_off;    // LanManager response offset
        byte    zero[2];
 
        short  nt_resp_len;    // NT response length (always 0x18)
        short  nt_resp_len;    // NT response length (always 0x18)
        short  nt_resp_off;    // NT response offset
        byte    zero[2];
 
        short  dom_len;        // domain string length
        short  dom_len;        // domain string length
        short  dom_off;        // domain string offset (always 0x40)
        byte    zero[2];
 
        short  user_len;        // username string length
        short  user_len;        // username string length
        short  user_off;        // username string offset
        byte    zero[2];
 
        short  host_len;        // host string length
        short  host_len;        // host string length
        short  host_off;        // host string offset
        byte    zero[6];
 
        short  msg_len;        // message length
        byte    zero[2];
 
        short  flags;          // 0x8201
        byte    zero[2];
 
        byte    dom[*];          // domain string (unicode)
        byte    user[*];        // username string (unicode)
        byte    host[*];        // host string (unicode)
        byte    lm_resp[*];      // LanManager response
        byte    nt_resp[*];      // NT response
    } type-3-message
</PRE><PRE>                0      1      2      3
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        0:  |  'N'  |  'T'  |  'L'  |  'M'  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        4:  |  'S'  |  'S'  |  'P'  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        8:  |  3  |  0  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        12:  |  LM-resp len  |  LM-Resp len  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        16:  |  LM-resp off  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        20:  |  NT-resp len  |  NT-Resp len  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        24:  |  NT-resp off  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        28:  | domain length | domain length |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        32:  | domain offset |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        36:  |  user length  |  user length  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        40:  |  user offset  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        44:  |  host length  |  host length  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        48:  |  host offset  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        52:  |  0  |  0  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        56:  |  message len  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        60:  | 0x01  | 0x82  |  0  |  0  |
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
        64:  | domain string                |
            +                              +
            .                              .
            .                              .
            +          +-------------------+
            |          | user string      |
            +-----------+                  +
            .                              .
            .                              .
            +                +-------------+
            |                | host string |
            +-----------------+            +
            .                              .
            .                              .
            +  +---------------------------+
            |  | LanManager-response      |
            +---+                          +
            .                              .
            .                              .
            +            +------------------+
            |            | NT-response      |
            +------------+                  +
            .                              .
            .                              .
            +-------+-------+-------+-------+
 
</PRE>
<P>The host, domain, and username strings are in Unicode (little-endian) and are
not nul-terminated; the host and domain names are in upper case. The lengths of
the response strings are 24.
<H3><A name=hashes>Password Hashes</A></H3>
<P>To calculate the two response strings two password hashes are used: the
LanManager password hash and the NT password hash. These are described in detail
in the Samba <A
href="ftp://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba/docs/textdocs/ENCRYPTION.txt">ENCRYPTION.txt</A>
document. However, a few things are not clear (such as what the magic constant
for the LanManager hash is), so here is some almost-C code which calculates the
two responses. Inputs are <VAR>passw</VAR> and <VAR>nonce</VAR>, the results are
in <VAR>lm_resp</VAR> and <VAR>nt_resp</VAR>. <PRE>    /* setup LanManager password */
 
    char  lm_pw[14];
    int  len = strlen(passw);
    if (len &gt; 14)  len = 14;
 
    for (idx=0; idx&lt;len; idx++)
        lm_pw[idx] = toupper(passw[idx]);
    for (; idx&lt;14; idx++)
        lm_pw[idx] = 0;
 
 
    /* create LanManager hashed password */
 
    unsigned char magic[] = { 0x4B, 0x47, 0x53, 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25 };
    unsigned char lm_hpw[21];
    des_key_schedule ks;
 
    setup_des_key(lm_pw, ks);
    des_ecb_encrypt(magic, lm_hpw, ks);
 
    setup_des_key(lm_pw+7, ks);
    des_ecb_encrypt(magic, lm_hpw+8, ks);
 
    memset(lm_hpw+16, 0, 5);
 
 
    /* create NT hashed password */
 
    int  len = strlen(passw);
    char  nt_pw[2*len];
    for (idx=0; idx&lt;len; idx++)
    {
        nt_pw[2*idx]  = passw[idx];
        nt_pw[2*idx+1] = 0;
    }
 
    unsigned char nt_hpw[21];
    MD4_CTX context;
    MD4Init(&amp;context);
    MD4Update(&amp;context, nt_pw, 2*len);
    MD4Final(nt_hpw, &amp;context);
 
    memset(nt_hpw+16, 0, 5);
 
 
    /* create responses */
 
    unsigned char lm_resp[24], nt_resp[24];
    calc_resp(lm_hpw, nonce, lm_resp);
    calc_resp(nt_hpw, nonce, nt_resp);
 
</PRE>
<P>Helpers: <PRE>    /*
    * takes a 21 byte array and treats it as 3 56-bit DES keys. The
    * 8 byte plaintext is encrypted with each key and the resulting 24
    * bytes are stored in the results array.
    */
    void calc_resp(unsigned char *keys, unsigned char *plaintext, unsigned char *results)
    {
        des_key_schedule ks;
 
        setup_des_key(keys, ks);
        des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock*) plaintext, (des_cblock*) results, ks, DES_ENCRYPT);
 
        setup_des_key(keys+7, ks);
        des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock*) plaintext, (des_cblock*) (results+8), ks, DES_ENCRYPT);
 
        setup_des_key(keys+14, ks);
        des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock*) plaintext, (des_cblock*) (results+16), ks, DES_ENCRYPT);
    }
 
 
    /*
    * turns a 56 bit key into the 64 bit, odd parity key and sets the key.
    * The key schedule ks is also set.
    */
    void setup_des_key(unsigned char key_56[], des_key_schedule ks)
    {
        des_cblock key;
 
        key[0] = key_56[0];
        key[1] = ((key_56[0] &lt;&lt; 7) &amp; 0xFF) | (key_56[1] &gt;&gt; 1);
        key[2] = ((key_56[1] &lt;&lt; 6) &amp; 0xFF) | (key_56[2] &gt;&gt; 2);
        key[3] = ((key_56[2] &lt;&lt; 5) &amp; 0xFF) | (key_56[3] &gt;&gt; 3);
        key[4] = ((key_56[3] &lt;&lt; 4) &amp; 0xFF) | (key_56[4] &gt;&gt; 4);
        key[5] = ((key_56[4] &lt;&lt; 3) &amp; 0xFF) | (key_56[5] &gt;&gt; 5);
        key[6] = ((key_56[5] &lt;&lt; 2) &amp; 0xFF) | (key_56[6] &gt;&gt; 6);
        key[7] =  (key_56[6] &lt;&lt; 1) &amp; 0xFF;
 
        des_set_odd_parity(&amp;key);
        des_set_key(&amp;key, ks);
    }
 
</PRE>
<H2><A name=connections>Keeping the connection alive</A></H2>
<P>As mentioned above, this scheme authenticates <EM>connections</EM>, not
requests. This manifests itself in that the network connection must be kept
alive during the second part of the handshake, i.e. between the receiving of the
type-2 message from the server (step 4) and the sending of the type-3 message
(step 5). Each time the connection is closed this second part (steps 3 through
6) must be repeated over the new connection (i.e. it's not enough to just keep
sending the last type-3 message). Also, once the connection is authenticated,
the Authorization header need not be sent anymore while the connection stays
open, no matter what resource is accessed.
<P>For implementations wishing to work with M$'s software this means that they
must make sure they use either HTTP/1.0 keep-alive's or HTTP/1.1 persistent
connections, and that they must be prepared to do the second part of the
handshake each time the connection was closed and is reopened. Server
implementations must also make sure that HTTP/1.0 responses contain a
Content-length header (as otherwise the connection must be closed after the
response), and that HTTP/1.1 responses either contain a Content-length header or
use the chunked transfer encoding.
<H2><A name=example>Example</A></H2>
<P>Here is an actual example of all the messages. Assume the host name is
"LightCity", the NT domain name is "Ursa-Minor", the username is "Zaphod", the
password is "Beeblebrox", and the server sends the nonce "SrvNonce". Then the
handshake is: <PRE>    C -&gt; S  GET ...
   
    S -&gt; C  401 Unauthorized
            WWW-Authenticate: NTLM
   
    C -&gt; S  GET ...
            Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAA7IAAAoACgApAAAACQAJACAAAABMSUdIVENJVFlVUlNBLU1JTk9S
   
    S -&gt; C  401 Unauthorized
            WWW-Authenticate: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAACAAAAAAAAACgAAAABggAAU3J2Tm9uY2UAAAAAAAAAAA==
   
    C -&gt; S  GET ...
            Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAADAAAAGAAYAHIAAAAYABgAigAAABQAFABAAAAADAAMAFQAAAASABIAYAAAAAAAAACiAAAAAYIAAFUAUgBTAEEALQBNAEkATgBPAFIAWgBhAHAAaABvAGQATABJAEcASABUAEMASQBUAFkArYfKbe/jRoW5xDxHeoxC1gBmfWiS5+iX4OAN4xBKG/IFPwfH3agtPEia6YnhsADT
   
    S -&gt; C  200 Ok
 
</PRE>
<P>and the unencoded messages are:
<P>Type-1 Message: <PRE>      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  a  b  c  d  e  f    0123456789abcdef
  0:  4e 54 4c 4d 53 53 50 00 01 00 00 00 03 b2 00 00  "NTLMSSP........."
  10:  0a 00 0a 00 29 00 00 00 09 00 09 00 20 00 00 00  "....)....... ..."
  20:  4c 49 47 48 54 43 49 54 59 55 52 53 41 2d 4d 49  "LIGHTCITYURSA-MI"
  30:  4e 4f 52                                        "NOR"
</PRE>
<P>Type-2 Message: <PRE>      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  a  b  c  d  e  f    0123456789abcdef
  0:  4e 54 4c 4d 53 53 50 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  "NTLMSSP........."
  10:  28 00 00 00 01 82 00 00 53 72 76 4e 6f 6e 63 65  "(.......SrvNonce"
  20:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                          "........"
</PRE>
<P>Type-3 Message: <PRE>      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  a  b  c  d  e  f    0123456789abcdef
  0:  4e 54 4c 4d 53 53 50 00 03 00 00 00 18 00 18 00  "NTLMSSP........."
  10:  72 00 00 00 18 00 18 00 8a 00 00 00 14 00 14 00  "r..............."
  20:  40 00 00 00 0c 00 0c 00 54 00 00 00 12 00 12 00  "@.......T......."
  30:  60 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a2 00 00 00 01 82 00 00  "`..............."
  40:  55 00 52 00 53 00 41 00 2d 00 4d 00 49 00 4e 00  "U.R.S.A.-.M.I.N."
  50:  4f 00 52 00 5a 00 61 00 70 00 68 00 6f 00 64 00  "O.R.Z.a.p.h.o.d."
  60:  4c 00 49 00 47 00 48 00 54 00 43 00 49 00 54 00  "L.I.G.H.T.C.I.T."
  70:  59 00 ad 87 ca 6d ef e3 46 85 b9 c4 3c 47 7a 8c  "Y....m..F...&lt;Gz."
  80:  42 d6 00 66 7d 68 92 e7 e8 97 e0 e0 0d e3 10 4a  "B..f}h.........J"
  90:  1b f2 05 3f 07 c7 dd a8 2d 3c 48 9a e9 89 e1 b0  "...?....-&lt;H....."
  a0:  00 d3                                            ".."
</PRE>
<P>For reference, the intermediate hashed passwords are:
 
<DL>
  <DT>lm_hpw (LanManager hashed password):
  <DD>91 90 16 f6 4e c7 b0 0b a2 35 02 8c a5 0c 7a 03 00 00 00 00 00
  <DT>nt_hpw (NT hashed password):
  <DD>8c 1b 59 e3 2e 66 6d ad f1 75 74 5f ad 62 c1 33 00 00 00 00 00 </DD></DL>
<H2><A name=resources>Resources</A></H2>
<DL><!--
<DT> <IMG ALT="*" SRC="/images/greenball.gif">
    A description and comparison of various http authentication schemes
<DD> <A HREF="http://www.cs.odu.edu/~asf/is2/2/paper.html">http://www.cs.odu.edu/~asf/is2/2/paper.html</A>
-->
  <DT><IMG alt=* src="NTLM_auth_files/greenball.gif"> Squid's NLTM
  authentication project
  <DD><A
  href="http://squid.sourceforge.net/ntlm/">http://squid.sourceforge.net/ntlm/</A>
<!--
<DT> <IMG ALT="*" SRC="/images/greenball.gif">
    A tutorial on authentication schemes available on IIS
<DD> <A HREF="http://www.aspalliance.com/flicks/">http://www.aspalliance.com/flicks/</A>
-->
  <DT><IMG alt=* src="NTLM_auth_files/greenball.gif"> Encryption description for
  Samba
  <DD><A
  href="ftp://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba/docs/textdocs/ENCRYPTION.txt">ftp://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba/docs/textdocs/ENCRYPTION.txt</A>
 
<!--
<DT> <IMG ALT="*" SRC="/images/greenball.gif">
    Paul Leach's presentation on NT security
<DD> <A HREF="http://www.cifs.com/2ndcifsconf/Microsoft-Leach3/index.html">http://www.cifs.com/2ndcifsconf/Microsoft-Leach3/index.html</A>
--><!--
<DT> <IMG ALT="*" SRC="/images/greenball.gif">
    Paul Ashton's page on the MSIE security hole (includes a link to his
    sources for an Apache module which exploits this hole)
<DD> <A HREF="http://www.argo.demon.co.uk/nt/ntie.html">http://www.argo.demon.co.uk/nt/ntie.html</A>
-->
  <DT><IMG alt=* src="NTLM_auth_files/greenball.gif"> Info on the MSIE security
  hole
  <DD><A
  href="http://oliver.efri.hr/~crv/security/bugs/NT/ie6.html">http://oliver.efri.hr/~crv/security/bugs/NT/ie6.html</A>
 
  <DT><IMG alt=* src="NTLM_auth_files/greenball.gif"> FAQ: NT Cryptographic
  Password Attacks &amp; Defences
  <DD><A
  href="http://www.ntbugtraq.com/default.asp?sid=1&amp;pid=47&amp;aid=17">http://www.ntbugtraq.com/default.asp?sid=1&amp;pid=47&amp;aid=17</A>
 
  <DT><IMG alt=* src="NTLM_auth_files/greenball.gif"> M$'s hotfix to disable the
  sending of the LanManager response
  <DD><A
  href="ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/winnt/winnt-public/fixes/usa/NT40/hotfixes-postSP3/lm-fix">ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/winnt/winnt-public/fixes/usa/NT40/hotfixes-postSP3/lm-fix</A>
 
  <DT><IMG alt=* src="NTLM_auth_files/greenball.gif"> A description of M$'s
  hotfix
  <DD><A
  href="http://www.tryc.on.ca/archives/bugtraq/1997_3/0070.html">http://www.tryc.on.ca/archives/bugtraq/1997_3/0070.html</A>
  </DD></DL>
 
<H2><A name=acks>Acknowledgements</A></H2>Special thanks to the following people
who helped with the collection and debugging of the above information:
<UL>
  <LI><A href="mailto:jlennard@dsg.com">Jon Lennard</A>
  <LI><A href="mailto:paul@argo.demon.co.uk">Paul Ashton</A>
  <LI><A href="mailto:samba-bugs@samba.anu.edu.au">Jeremy Allison</A> </LI></UL>
<HR>
 
<ADDRESS>Ronald Tschalär / 14. March 2001 / <A
href="mailto:ronald@innovation.ch">ronald@innovation.ch</A>.
</ADDRESS>
 
</HTML>

Latest revision as of 13:56, 25 February 2008

References

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